ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST AND RUSSIA IN CONSERVATIVE RESURRECTION

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ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA:
THE DECLINE OF THE WEST AND RUSSIA IN CONSERVATIVE RESURRECTION
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Foreword


Ethno-Cultural Identity in Europe and Eurasia

On October 31st, 2016 the Eurasian Movement of Russia hosted an international scientific-practical round table in Moscow on the topic of "Ethno-cultural identity in Europe and Eurasia", which was the basis for this paper.

The round table was attended by young scientists, journalists and civil society activists from Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey.

The event was dedicated to the People’s Unity Day in Russia and thus to the question on how to ensure such a unity. The basis of any national identity is the structure and the approach to the ethno-cultural identity of its peoples. The only true basis for national unity in the Russian Federation, and furthermore - in Eurasia, can only be the idea of Eurasianism. The purpose of the round table was a comparative analysis of the approaches and definitions of ethno-cultural identity in contemporary Europe and Eurasia – in particular in Russia and Turkey.

The first speaker was Jan Schnaider, deputy director, Center for Continental Cooperation, who gave a report on "The history and cultural influence of Cultural Marxism on modern Europe". In his introductory report, Schnaider accused the theory of post-structuralism and postmodernism, the evolution of Trotskyism in the West after Stalin, the Frankfurt School and the Fabian Society, the
“generation of 1968”, which is now in power in the West, of undermining the traditional values and cultural foundations of Europe.

Continuing the theme of the moral degradation of Western society, Jurij Kofner, chairman, Eurasian Movement of Russia, gave a report entitled "Liberalism or postliberalism - who is the real enemy?". In his statement he proved that liberalism is not the main opponent of the traditionalists, because it is neither worse, nor nor better than the other two political theories of modernity - communism and nationalism. All the contemporary troubles of the global world (American imperialism, the financial oligarchy, militant Satanism, unchecked capitalism, etc.) are to blame not so much on liberalism, rather than on its degenerate form - postliberalism of the postmodern era. While still using in public all the slogans of Western values (freedom, progress, democracy), the ideological subject of postliberalism is not the individual anymore, as it is in liberalism, but the transnational corporations. Postliberalism is a simulacrum to liberal theory. In fighting traditional collective identities (religion, class, culture), allegedly for “the good of the liberation of the individual“, it actually leads to the enslavement of the individual under the yoke of the global financial oligarchy and the deep state.

The only alternative to sprawling the hegemony of Cultural Marxism and postmodernism, leading to the destruction of the traditional collective institutions (family, peoples, nation, religion, class), can only be the Fourth political theory, in particular its approach to the definition and development of ethno-cultural identity. The Russian-Eurasian version of this theory is Eurasianism and Russian socio-religious philosophy. This was argued in a report given by Anton Zheleznyak, head, Orenburg Branch, Eurasian Movement of Russia. In Eurasianism, there are three levels of ethno-cultural identity in the Russian-Eurasian space: ethnic, national and civilizational. For example: Tatars, “Russian” citizens (rus. “rossiyane”) and Eurasians, respectively. As a result, on the complementarity of these “patriotisms” the so called "symphonic personality" (Savitsky, Karsavin), “pan-Eurasian nationalism” (Troubetskoy) and the "blossoming complexity" (Leontiev) of Russia-Eurasia are built upon.
Identarianism can be seen as the European version of the Fourth political theory. This was stated in the report "The concept of ethno-cultural identity of the Identarian Movement", given by Michael Pflugfelder, deputy director, Center for Continental Cooperation. European identarianism has two forerunners: the German Conservative Revolution and the ideological trend of the New Right. It includes several very similar to Eurasianism concepts: ethnopluralism, traditionalism, the three above mentioned levels of ethno-cultural identity, multipolarism and holistic democracy. The identarianists oppose the mass immigration and the Islamization of Europe. As with the Eurasian Movement of Russia, their strategy is aimed at meta-political activities and includes three elements: theory, activism, community. Calling identarianism a similar to Eurasianism ideology, Pflugfelder at the same time condemned the lack of criticism from the identarianists against the US-American cultural and military-political hegemony over Europe, which is in fact the main cause of the autochthonous population decline and of mass immigration, a process they call the “Great Replacement”.

Farkhad Gumarov, head, Tatarstan branch, Eurasian Movement of Russia, gave a comparative analysis of the "Ethno-cultural identity in contemporary Turkey and Tatarstan." In contrast to the Tatars, who, according to the Eurasianist concept of the three levels of ethno-cultural identity, nicely fit into the picture of Tatar, Russian and pan-Eurasian patriotism, the Turks have not yet finished the search of their own national identity. Turkey can be identified as a Eurasian rimland country (Spykman) -a fact, which is further confirmed by the repeatedly failed attempts of Turkey's EU accession.
Preserving the Peoples’ Identities

Today we need new strategies to preserve our identity in a rapidly changing world, a world that has become more open, transparent and interdependent. This fact confronts virtually all countries and all peoples in one form or another: Russian, European, Chinese and American – the societies of virtually all countries.

For Russians and Russia, questions about who we are and who we want to be are increasingly prominent in our society. We have left behind Soviet ideology, and there will be no return. Proponents of fundamental conservatism who idealise pre-1917 Russia seem to be similarly far from reality, as are supporters of an extreme, western-style liberalism.

It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-determination. Without this we will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges, nor we will succeed in global competitions. And today we see a new round of such competitions. Today their main focuses are economic-technological and ideological-informational. Military-political problems and general conditions are worsening. The world is becoming more rigid, and sometimes forgoes not merely international law, but also basic decency.

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Every country has to have military, technological and economic strength, but nevertheless the main thing that will determine success is the quality of citizens, the quality of society: their intellectual, spiritual and moral strength. After all, in the end economic growth, prosperity and geopolitical influence are all derived from societal conditions. They depend on whether the citizens of a given country consider themselves a nation, to what extent they identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united by common goals and responsibilities. In this sense, the question of finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia.

Meanwhile, today Russia’s national identity is experiencing not only objective pressures stemming from globalisation, but also the consequences of the national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we experienced the collapse of our state two different times. The result was a devastating blow to our nation’s cultural and spiritual codes; we were faced with the disruption of traditions and the consonance of history, with the demoralisation of society, with a deficit of trust and responsibility. These are the root causes of many pressing problems we face. After all, the question of responsibility for oneself, before society and the law, is something fundamental for both legal and everyday life.

After 1991 there was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology, would simply appear by itself. The state, authorities, intellectual and political classes virtually rejected engaging in this work, all the more so since previous, semi-official ideology was hard to swallow. And in fact they were all simply afraid to even broach the subject. In addition, the lack of a national idea stemming from a national identity profited the quasi-colonial element of the elite – those determined to steal and remove capital, and who did not link their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money.

Practice has shown that a new national idea does not simply appear, nor does it develop according to market rules. A spontaneously constructed state and society does not work, and neither does mechanically copying other countries’ experiences. Such primitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad were not
accepted by an absolute majority of our people. This is because the desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our national character. Incidentally, such approaches have often failed in other nations too. The time when ready-made lifestyle models could be installed in foreign states like computer programmes has passed.

We also understand that identity and a national idea cannot be imposed from above, cannot be established on an ideological monopoly. Such a construction is very unstable and vulnerable; we know this from personal experience. It has no future in the modern world. We need historical creativity, a synthesis of the best national practices and ideas, an understanding of our cultural, spiritual and political traditions from different points of view, and to understand that [national identity] is not a rigid thing that will last forever, but rather a living organism. Only then will our identity be based on a solid foundation, be directed towards the future and not the past. This is the main argument demonstrating that a development ideology must be discussed by people who hold different views, and have different opinions about how and what to do to solve given problems.

All of us – so-called Neo-Slavophiles and Neo-Westernisers, statists and so-called liberals – all of society must work together to create common development goals. We need to break the habit of only listening to like-minded people, angrily – and even with hatred – rejecting any other point of view from the outset. You can’t flip or even kick the country’s future like a football, plunging into unbridled nihilism, consumerism, criticism of anything and everything, or gloomy pessimism.

This means that liberals have to learn to talk with representatives of the left-wing and, conversely, that nationalists must remember that Russia was formed specifically as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country from its very inception. Nationalists must remember that by calling into question our multi-ethnic character, and exploiting the issue of Russian, Tatar, Caucasian, Siberian or any other nationalism or separatism, means that we are starting to destroy our genetic code. In effect, we will begin to destroy ourselves.
Russia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are unconditional. These are red lines no one is allowed to cross. For all the differences in our views, debates about identity and about our national future are impossible unless their participants are patriotic. Of course I mean patriotism in the purest sense of the word.

Too often in our nation's history, instead of opposition to the government we have been faced with opponents of Russia itself. I have already mentioned this; Pushkin also talked about it. And we know how it ended, with the demolition of the [Russian] state as such. There is virtually no Russian family that completely escaped the troubles of the past century. Questions about how to assess certain historical events still divide our country and society.

We need to heal these wounds, and repair the tissues of our historic fabric. We can no longer engage in self-deception, striking out unsightly or ideologically uncomfortable pages of our history, breaking links between generations, rushing to extremes, creating or debunking idols. It's time to stop only taking note of the bad in our history, and berating ourselves more than even our opponents would do. [Self-]criticism is necessary, but without a sense of self-worth, or love for our Fatherland, such criticism becomes humiliating and counterproductive.

We must be proud of our history, and we have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history must be a part of Russian identity. Without recognising this it is impossible to establish mutual trust and allow society to move forward.

Another serious challenge to Russia's identity is linked to events taking place in the world. Here there are both foreign policy and moral aspects. We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.
The excesses of political correctness have reached the point where people are seriously talking about registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia. People in many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk about their religious affiliations. Holidays are abolished or even called something different; their essence is hidden away, as is their moral foundation. And people are aggressively trying to export this model all over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis.

What else but the loss of the ability to self-reproduce could act as the greatest testimony of the moral crisis facing a human society? Today almost all developed nations are no longer able to reproduce themselves, even with the help of migration. Without the values embedded in Christianity and other world religions, without the standards of morality that have taken shape over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity. We consider it natural and right to defend these values. One must respect every minority’s right to be different, but the rights of the majority must not be put into question.

At the same time we see attempts to somehow revive a standardised model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty. Such a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals. In a historical sense this amounts to a rejection of one’s own identity, of the God-given diversity of the world.

Russia agrees with those who believe that key decisions should be worked out on a collective basis, rather than at the discretion of and in the interests of certain countries or groups of countries. Russia believes that international law, not the right of the strong, must apply. And we believe that every country, every nation is not exceptional, but unique, original and benefits from equal rights, including the right to independently choose their own development path.

This is our conceptual outlook, and it follows from our own historical destiny and Russia’s role in global politics. Our present position has deep historical roots. Russia itself has evolved on the basis of
diversity, harmony and balance, and brings such a balance to the international stage.

I want to remind you that the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the agreements made at Yalta in 1945, taken with Russia’s very active participation, secured a lasting peace. Russia’s strength, the strength of a winning nation at those critical junctures, manifested itself as generosity and justice. And let us remember [the Treaty of] Versailles, concluded without Russia’s participation. Many experts, and I absolutely agree with them, believe that Versailles laid the foundation for the Second World War because the Treaty of Versailles was unfair to the German people: it imposed restrictions with which they could not cope, and the course of the next century became clear.

There is one more fundamental aspect to which I want to draw your attention. In Europe and some other countries so-called multiculturalism is in many respects a transplanted, artificial model that is now being questioned, for understandable reasons. This is because it is based on paying for the colonial past. It is no accident that today European politicians and public figures are increasingly talking about the failures of multiculturalism, and that they are not able to integrate foreign languages or foreign cultural elements into their societies.

Over the past centuries in Russia, which some have tried to label as the "prison of nations"!, not even the smallest ethnic group has disappeared. And they have retained not only their internal autonomy and cultural identity, but also their historical space. You know, I was interested to learn (I did not even know this) that in Soviet times [authorities] paid such careful attention to this that virtually every small ethnic group had its own print publication, support for its language, and for its national literature. We should bring back and take on board much of what has been done in this respect.

Along with this the different cultures in Russia have the unique experience of mutual influence, mutual enrichment and mutual respect. This multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity lives in our historical consciousness, in our spirit and in our historical makeup. Our state was built in the course of a millennium on this organic model.
Russia – as philosopher Konstantin Leontyev vividly put it – has always evolved in "blossoming complexity“ as a state-civilisation, reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other traditional religions. It is precisely the state-civilisation model that has shaped our state polity. It has always sought to flexibly accommodate the ethnic and religious specificity of particular territories, ensuring diversity in unity.

Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions are an integral part of Russia’s identity, its historical heritage and the present-day lives of its citizens. The main task of the state, as enshrined in the Constitution, is to ensure equal rights for members of traditional religions and atheists, and the right to freedom of conscience for all citizens.

However, it is clearly impossible to identify oneself only through one’s ethnicity or religion in such a large nation with a multi-ethnic population. In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop a civic identity on the basis of shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, and a sense of responsibility for their homeland’s fate, without losing touch with their ethnic or religious roots.

There are broad discussions on how the ideology of national development will be structured politically and conceptually – including with your participation, colleagues. But I deeply believe that individuals’ personal, moral, intellectual and physical development must remain at the heart of our philosophy. Back at the start of the 1990s, Solzhenitsyn stated that the nation’s main goal should be to preserve the population after a very difficult 20th century. Today, we must admit that we have not yet fully overcome the negative demographic trends, although we have veered away from a dangerous decline in the national potential.

Unfortunately, throughout our nation’s history, little value was given at times to individual human lives. Too often, people were seen simply as a means, rather than a goal and a mission for development. We no longer have that right and we cannot throw millions of human lives into the fire for the sake of development. We must treasure every
individual. Russia’s main strength in this and future centuries will lie in its educated, creative, physically and spiritually healthy people, rather than natural resources.

The role of education is all the more important because in order to educate an individual, a patriot, we must restore the role of great Russian culture and literature. They must serve as the foundation for people’s personal identity, the source of their uniqueness and their basis for understanding the national idea. Here, a great deal depends on the teaching community, which has been and remains a highly important guardian of nationwide values, ideas and philosophies. This community speaks the same language – the language of science, knowledge and education, despite the fact that it is spread out over an enormous territory, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. In this way, the community of teachers, the educational community overall, in the broad sense of the word, binds the nation together. Supporting this community is one of the most important steps on the path toward a strong, flourishing Russia.

I want to stress again that without focussing our efforts on people’s education and health, creating mutual responsibility between the authorities and each individual, and establishing trust within society, we will be losers in the competition of history. Russia’s citizens must feel that they are the responsible owners of their country, region, hometown, property, belongings and their lives. A citizen is someone who is capable of independently managing his or her own affairs, freely cooperating with equals.

Local governments and self-regulated citizens’ organisations serve as the best school for civic consciousness. Of course, I’m referring to non-profits. Incidentally, one of the best Russian political traditions, the country council tradition, was also built on the principles of local government. A true civil society and a true, nationally-focused political elite, including the opposition with its own ideology, values and standards for good and evil – their own, rather than those dictated by the media or from abroad – can only grow through effective self-governing mechanisms. The government is prepared to trust self-regulating and self-governing associations, but we must know whom we are trusting. This is absolutely normal global practice,
which is precisely why we have passed new legislation to increase the transparency of nongovernmental organisations.

Speaking of any kind of reforms, it is important to bear in mind that there is more to our nation than just Moscow and St Petersburg. In developing Russian federalism, we must rely on our own historical experience, using flexible and diverse models. The Russian model of federalism has a great deal of potential built into it. It is imperative that we learn to use it competently, not forgetting its most important aspect: the development of the regions and their independence should create equal opportunities for all of our nation’s citizens, regardless of where they live, to eliminate inequalities in the economic and social development of Russia’s territory, thereby strengthening the nation’s unity. Ultimately, this is a huge challenge because these territories’ development has been very unbalanced over the course of decades and even centuries.

I would like to touch on another topic. The 21st century promises to become the century of major changes, the era of the formation of major geopolitical zones, as well as financial and economic, cultural, civilizational, and military and political areas. That is why integrating with our neighbours is our absolute priority. The future Eurasian Economic Union, which we have declared and which we have discussed extensively as of late, is not just a collection of mutually beneficial agreements. The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.

I want to stress that Eurasian integration will also be built on the principle of diversity. This is a union where everyone maintains their identity, their distinctive character and their political independence. Together with our partners, we will gradually implement this project, step by step. We expect that it will become our common input into maintaining diversity and stable global development.

Colleagues, the years after 1991 are often referred to as the post-Soviet era. We have lived through and overcome that turbulent, dramatic
period. Russia has passed through these trials and tribulations and is returning to itself, to its own history, just as it did at other points in its history. After consolidating our national identity, strengthening our roots, and remaining open and receptive to the best ideas and practices of the East and the West, we must and will move forward.
The Ideology of the Identarian Movement of Europe

The Identarian movement is a pan-European socio-political movement aimed at the preservation of the ethno-cultural identities of the European peoples and with the intent of spreading across Europe. The largest branches of the movement are now growing in Germany and Austria.

There are two main theoretical influences of the Identarian movement: firstl, the German Conservative Revolution, and secondly, the French Nouvelle Droite. The latter is due to the fact that the beginnings of the European Identarian movement lie in France with the founding of the “Jeunesse Identitaire” in 2002. Nowadays the identarian ideology is based on the concepts of ethnopluralism and multipolarism (which is expressed in their principle “0% Rascism, 100% Identity”); of ethno-cultural identity (on the regional, national and civilizational levels); of the Fourth political theory; as well as of holistic democracy. The Identarians are against the Islamization of Europe, they reject mass immigration – a process they call the “Great Replacement”. Their strategy is aimed at dominating the metapolitics (the public discourse) together with building up a patriotic front, and it is based on three pillars: theory, activism, community. The Identarian movement offers a comprehensive solution to the so-called “refugee” crisis: 1. safe borders, 2. help on site and termination of Western imperialism in the “refugee” origin countries (Arab world, North Africa), 3. Repatriation of already arrived illegal immigrants.
Many Identarians see Russia and Putin as a benchmark since the Russians, on the contrary to Western Europe, are in general more patriotic and oriented on traditional Christian values, and they have a by far lesser acceptance for mass immigration.

Identarianism can be seen as a similar to Eurasianism ideology. However, at the same time, the Identarian movement unfortunately still doesn’t publicly criticize the US-American cultural and military-political hegemony over Europe, which is in fact the main cause of the autochthonous population decline within, as well as of mass immigration to Europe, i.e. the exact process they call the “Great Replacement”. 
Martin Sellner

Interview given to the Eurasian Movement of Russia at the 4th “Sovereignty Conference”, organized by the COMPACT Magazin, that took place in Berlin on October 24th, 2015.

European Identitarianism and Russian Eurasianism

- What is identitarianism?

- We don’t use the word “identitarianism.” We say “to be identitarian”. It’s a fundamental lifestyle that means that we consciously fight to preserve our ethnocultural identity with our very heart and soul.

- People say – and you agree – that identitarians run deep to the New Right.

- We are grounded on two pillars, two main schools: the New Right and the Conservative Revolution. We are also influenced by many other conservative thinkers. Our rejection of national socialism and fascism, as well as of racism and of antisemitism, unites us with the New Right.

Tell us about the Conservative Revolution.

The Conservative Revolution is a peculiarity of German history. It is a very German thing. It’s as diverse as the Identitarian movement itself, represented by figures such as Ernst Jünger, Edgar Jung, and Arthur Möller van der Bruck. We (and I in particular) see in it a tradition that we continue today. In national socialism, on the other hand, we can observe a distortion that lead the predominant mood in Germany at that time in an extremely negative direction. In this connection I’d like to quote Ernst Jünger: “The harvest of the conservative-
revolutionary mood was reaped by the one school that presented its ideas in the cheapest manner.” Of course, he was referring to national socialism. Today the aim of our movement is not to enable the triumph of simplistic, misanthropic ideas, be they what they may.

- **You call to save the ethnocultural identity and national sovereignty of the European nations. Are you eurosceptics? Are you against Europe?**

- It really depends on what you mean by “Europe.” Our message is clear: “This European Union is not our Europe!” We are very pro-European, insofar as this means that we aren’t narrow-minded parochialists. We do understand that there is a level of civilization that exists above individual nations – for us this is Europe of course. Yet we consider the contemporary European Union to be a problematic project, as it doesn’t “see” nations, and it influences the whole region very destructively. It is supranational (not intranational, -CCC). The EU is as a glove that was put on inside out: On the inside it has too much regulation and bureaucracy, and on the outside it is soft and ripe for plunder. I would call myself a euro-patriot, yet am incredibly critical of the EU. There is no contradiction in that.

- **You’re a critic of Brusselocracy.**

- Absolutely!

- **Is liberalism the main enemy?**

- First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between an enemy and an opponent. I’d say that we oppose the three political theories of modernity – liberalism, communism and (parochial) nationalism. Importantly, if we fight against individualism, relativism and egalitarianism in liberalism – the ideology that emerged victorious after 1991 and now enjoys ubiquitous dominance – then yes, this kind of liberalism is now the main enemy.

- **You mentioned the two flanks that form the ideology of your movement: the New Right and the Conservative Revolution. But can’t you regard identitarians as followers of the Fourth way as well?**
- The Fourth political theory is a great inspiration, not for all of us, but for most of us. I personally like the systematisation of the three European political theories — liberalism, communism and nationalism.

I would like to come back to the previous question. Most people in Europe who call themselves liberals and adhere to ordoliberalism — the Scottish school of thought — are libertarians, or maybe even paleoconservatives and the like. Yet in fact, they have identitarian positions. You therefore have to be careful with terminology so as not to frighten off those who think patriotically. It’s necessary to distinguish between conservative liberalism and liberalism as a progressive movement (even more progressive than communism).

- You pointed out the need to distinguish between an opponent and an enemy. Who or what do European identitarians fight against?

- We see the main cause of moral decay, which initially lead to mass immigration, in liberal decadence and foreign geopolitical influence over Europe. However, the fight against mass immigration is our main priority. We believe that a nation can always recover from a cultural-moral crisis and that it can ultimately free itself from a foreign yoke, but it can never recover from the “Great Replacement”.

- What is the “Great Replacement”?

- The “Great Replacement” is one of the key concepts within our theory. This term describes the displacement and substitution of an autochthonous by a non-native population, i.e. when locals are made into a minority within their own country by mass foreign immigration.
- Why do you reject the previous political theories?

- This is due to the fact that liberalism with its individualism makes each human entity absolute. It considers “humankind” to be no more than its atomic individuals, whom it separates from their organic environments, religions, cultures, families, nations, and finally from their own gender identities, which we witness in the so called “gender madness.” Communism represents an egalitarian ideology and accepts only classes. It also forgets about ethnocultural identity, knows only the abstract “all of humanity,” and, from my point of view, goes too far in its collectivism, infringing on individual liberty. And in (myopic, - CCC) nationalism, I see a chauvinistic and narrow-minded fixation on one’s own nation. It completely forgets about belongingness to a civilization, leading only to fratricidal wars. I believe that our aim – as people who grew out of old ideas or, as Nietzsche said, “liberated themselves from the old idols” – is to learn from the positive aspects of these three previous political theories...

- Which are... ?

- In liberalism it is the personal freedom, which we can find in the traditions of the European nations, especially in ancient Greek mythology: Odysseus, Achilles... They are strong free individuals. The free warrior. The free farmer who has his own land, his honor. Then, in communism we have solidarity, communality. These are convictions which existed back in the Middle Ages: We shouldn’t allow people to sink into poverty, we should support one other; property is connected not only with rights, but also with obligations; land and national wealth belong to the peoples rather than transnational corporations. In nationalism, the positive features are the cultural heritage and the thought of belonging to a particular historically grown community. It is always something specific: origin, culture and religion.

If we take all the positive aspects of these three ideologies, but refrain from idealizing them, then we discover new horizons and forge a new path, the path taken by European Identitarian movement.

- Which part does religion play in the identitarian ideology?
- (Laughs). Yes, this is somewhat an “apple of discord” within our movement, because there is a great split between neopagans and Christians among European new right-wingers that earlier often led to conflicts. We overcame this problem, because we agreed on the “least common denominator” within our Identitarian discourse: We all fight to save our ethnocultural identity, but observe freedom of thought in all other matters. This is even an advantage that strengthens our movement. We say that we fight against the enemies of all European cultural and religious traditions. This is why radical neopagans wearing a Thor’s hammer, for example, stand hand in hand with staunch Catholic and Orthodox Christians during our summer camp in France. They have a mutual respect for each other’s religiosity. Even representatives from such novel movements such as the “solar Christians” (fre. “chretiens solairs”) appeared among the French identitarians. They are baptized Christians, faithful children of the Church, yet they are not opposed to celebrating pagan seasonal holidays as part of their Northern-European cultural heritage.

- You said that you fight against the “Great Replacement”, i.e. mass immigration and Islamisation that threaten European identity. But, what about your attitude towards the Americanisation of Europe?

- “To be an identitarian” means to defend one’s ethnocultural identity. The ethnocultural identity has three levels: the regional, the national and the civilizational (in our case the European civilazation); and, as the term implies, it includes also two aspects: the ethnic and the cultural. Cultural identity is as important to us as the ethnic one. Yet Europe’s cultural identity has already suffered from Americanization for decades, diminishing our national awareness so greatly that even this mass immigration became possible. The Islamisation of our society – a byproduct of the current mass immigration – threatens our ethnic identity. The long-standing Americanization, on the other hand, deprived us of the awareness that we belong to an original cultural space. That is why both struggles—against Islamization and against Americanization – are interrelated for us. This means that we must defend our European ethnocultural identity against further creeping Americanization at all three levels.
- Many people see Vladimir Putin as a defender of national identity, and I think this is a fair statement. He gave an important speech on this subject at the Valdai Forum in 2013, which I would call absolutely “identitarian”. What do the European identitarians think about Putin and his ideas?

- I cannot provide an official position of the Identitarian movement on Putin and his policy, because we generally consciously avoid taking official positions on certain geopolitical issues. However, it is obvious for me personally that Russia’s image is very perverted in the Western media. I personally see Putin as a great statesman; you can see by his policies that he wants all the best for his nation and his peoples, he acts as a true patriot and a true identitarian, he defends international law, and also promotes a multipolar (ethnopluralistic, - CCC) world order. That is my personal opinion. But at the same time, as far as many “Putinists” are concerned, the “Putinverstehers”, as they are called, I must say that we can’t rely on Putin and Russia to save Europe. Although I see Putin as rather a Germanophile and a friend of Europe, I am certain that we must free ourselves from postmodernism from within. We should fight immigration and external influence independently. Here the Identitarian movement plays an important role in liberation from American hegemony.

- Do you see in Putin’s identitarian policy any positive ideas or parallels to the European identitarian worldview and activism? After all, Putin advocates ethnic pluralism and multipolarity.

- Yes, of course! Ethnic pluralism and multipolarity in international relations, diversity of nations, cultural diversity — all these are fundamentals of our ideology. And Putin deserves my personal respect for these elements.

- In your opinion, is there an ideology in Russia that is similar to “identarianism”?

- Eurasianism, of course. I see great parallels to us in the Eurasianist Movement and the Orthodox patriotic revival of Russia in their attempt to overcome the three ideologies of modernity, in their attempt to rediscover Russia’s polyethnic and religious cultural
identity and at the same time avoiding the false path of national chauvinism.

- At the end of our interview I would like to answer from our part that I personally see the Identitarian movement as the new force for Europe’s rescue. We, as Eurasianists, as Russians, think that Europe must be liberated from the American hegemony and that the European nation-states should become sovereign again. Of course, we advocate for a continental alliance between Russia and Europe, but it should be an equal partnership. To this extent I hope for our cooperation in the future. In this context I am convinced that our ideas and goals are identitarian.

- When we defend our own ethnic and cultural identity we automatically legitimate the right of all nations and peoples to their ethnocultural identity. All who stand today for their own culture – opposing global unification and the complete dissolution of all collective identities in the postmodern image of humanity – are indeed allies in our common fight.
Cultural Marxism and the Decline of the West

During the time that has elapsed since the end of the “First” Cold War, international relations have undergone significant changes related to accelerating globalization.

In 1999, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens conducted a series of lectures, called "Runaway World", revealing how globalization affects our lives. In his lectures he dealt with issues relating to changes in state sovereignty, family, culture of the elite and masses, traditions, gender roles, noting that in the last decade, the processes previously not affecting the entire world, or to a large extent affecting mostly the countries of the former socialist camp, had turned around with greater intensity, connected with the collapse of the bipolar world.

During the First Cold War one of the forces contributed to the spread of internationalism throughout culture and civil society was the creation of a global free market system and the mutual fusion/penetration of cultures. The countries of the socialist camp were closed but even more closed from each other even despite the dependence for some of them on subsidies. They were also more autocratic.

In the West, there existed a proclaimed ideological diversity and a multiparty system. In the East we saw the dominance of Marxist ideology and the power of one party allegedly representing the interests of the majority.
In the transatlantic community of the nations the government was not thought of as determining socio-economic life, in the continental block however, there were command-administrative systems in place. Although each country’s system had its own endemic features, even including the presence of certain elements of market economies.

For this reason, the supporters of state intervention in the economy, culture, science and social life are called “left-wing” in the Western discourse. Their opponents are labeled as “right-wing”. The most striking example of this we can see in contemporary Germany, where the successor of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) is called simple "The Left" (dt. Die Linke).

In this regard there remain unanswered questions such as; whether it is correct to call free market advocates and Western liberals as "right-wing", whether we should call the regimes which were controlled by the Soviet Union as “left-wing”, and whether we can talk about the collapse of Marxism after 1991. Everything is not as simple as it seems at first glance.

Of course, today one rarely comes across a liberal who is defending the state (rather than criticizing it), who is not opposing the Left and who is not criticizing them for statism. In fact, neither the “liberals”, nor the “leftists” can be labeled as such at any given time. People who see the Left as statist, see only the tip of the iceberg. In the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, there was already enough said about the future extinction of the state and the absence of a “homeland” for workers.

The Right, for its part, was initially focused on a certain territory or peoples and this in fact implied the idea of a “state”. However, during 1989-1990 the socialist systems in the COMECON countries were overthrown not by nationalists and conservatives, but by liberals and globalists. This is due largely to the fact that because of their “statism” those “left-wing” regimes were in fact largely “right-wing”. In the West, this period coincided with the supra-national reorganization of the European nation states. The Single Europe Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) contributed to the formation of a new form of political organization – the EU – which replaced the nation states of Europe.
The anti-state nature of the free market ideology was not initially clear during the reign of Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan. Later the Left seized the initiative from the Right in order to achieve their own goals. Economic globalism creates the perfect breeding grounds for international socialist action. Marx argued that "a free trade system brings social revolution". Thus, the USSR was criticized as being a damper on the development of a “favorable” world market, not only by Trotskyites, but even by many Marxists of reactionary character.

Since the 1980s many politicians have seen the ideology of globalism as a tool for dismantling the nation state. French Finance Minister Alain Madeleine said: "Liberalism - this is the philosophy of the sovereignty of the individual, not the state". This constation later facilitated the use of market ideology to achieve the goals of the supporters of a post-national society. In 1989, Jacques Delors presented a paper on the issue which was later implemented in the 1999 introduction of the Euro.

Many of today's political leaders in Europe also played a significant role in the 1960s student movement half a century ago. Bernard Kouchner, a former communist and creator of the organization called "Doctors without Borders" ended up gaining supra-national authority. These facts remind us how much influence Marxist ideology actually possessed in the West during the First Cold War. Being Marxist in nature, however, did not prevent this ideology from being anti-Soviet at the same time. With the expulsion of Leonid Trotsky from the Soviet Union to the West, the radical anti-statist form of Marxism was also exported. During the confrontation between the two camps, Soviet dissidents and anti-communists were given a rather cold reception in the West, while many Trotskyites were greeted warmly by the CIA and other transatlantic intelligence agencies. These Trotskyites were opposed to the Soviet regimes, but not against the Marxist idea. As a result the West won by demonstrating its internationality and its progressiveness.

After the victory of the West in 1991, changes began that led to the fact that even the leaders of the states found themselves increasingly dependent on international institutions: serving as examples of this are the international intervention in Yugoslavia, the establishment of international criminal courts where cases were heard without having
had the leaders sign on to the new rules of the game. The West conducted institutional changes but the East refused to dismantle national structures.

Representatives of international organizations quickly became similar to the Commissars in the early Soviet regime, as they began to protect the idea of Supra-Nationalism. All supranational formations support the thesis that in 1991 there was not a victory over Marxist ideology, but rather its ubiquitous spread.

Of course the truth being that it had undergone considerable changes itself.

If earlier everything related primarily to economic issues, today one cannot restrict everything to merely the economic side of the equation. At the forefront are the typical features of our day, like political correctness and contemporary feminism, products of Marxism (note, however, that feminism is not as such). Therefore we must ask, what is hiding behind these peaceful concepts?

What are the roots of political correctness? One fact is that cultural Marxism migrated from the economic to the cultural space. Its roots go back to the 1920’s to Antonio Gramsci and the founders of the Frankfurt School, of which this ideology is the brainchild. The representatives of the Frankfurt School considered it necessary for "the salvation of Western civilization."

The roots of this school ideology lie in a mixture of Marx and Freud.

The parallels between the old, economic Marxism and cultural Marxism, which gave rise to this trend in philosophy, are obvious.

First, due to the fact that by nature all people have different opportunities, equal conditions and equality of results must be achieved by force.

Second, both economic and cultural Marxism univariately explain the course of history. If economic Marxism is based on relationships and the means of production, then the cultural side means the dominance of one or another cultural, racial or gender group.
Cultural Marxism says that history as a whole determines which group, a certain sex, race, religion or sexual orientation, has power over the other groups.

Third, both varieties of Marxism declare some social groups virtuous and the other labeled as a source of evil and injustice including: white men, Christians and even conservative migrants.

Fourth, both Marxisms offer to achieve equality through expropriation, which in reality is expressed later as positive discrimination.

Fifth, both types of Marxism offer analysis, which serves to confirm the ideology in every situation (economic and linguistic). These allowed them to distort the facts, making it possible to continue to use both types. Both analyses give pseudoscientific ideological views. Proponents of cultural Marxism throughout the economic history have repeatedly been driven from the ranks.

Today, economic Marxism is not playing the same role, its path continues towards the cultural. With this in mind the ideology of political correctness has captured not only the left but also the right political flank and in addition, it is dominant on the campuses of Western universities.

Some people take it as a joke, but do so at their own risk. This ideology ultimately and seriously is seeking to change almost all of the formal and informal rules that govern the relationships between people and public institutions. It wants us to change our behavior, thoughts and even the words we use. To a large extent this has already happened. As they say: who controls the language, controls the mind.

This is the main parallel between classical and cultural Marxism: both are totalitarian ideologies. The totalitarian nature of political correctness, we can observe on campuses, where Political Correctness (PC) takes precedence over Science: freedom of speech, freedom of the press and even of the thoughts; all of it is eliminated under a dictatorship of opinion.
All of us have probably heard terms like tolerance, anti-discrimination or discrimination, human rights, racism, etc.

A special place in the ideology of political correctness is taken by feminism. The roots of it go back to the time when there was no Marxism. The first feminists argued for more extensive rights for women and in their days were radicals. For all intents and purposes the complete feminization of modern Europe began in the 1960s. Today's radical feminist statements are intended to destroy European culture, which was created over the centuries and with which the followers of this ideology are not satisfied. It would be reasonable to assume that feminists would be satisfied with the achievement of equality between men and women, but the influence of cultural Marxism makes their movement unbending to compromise, with feminists wishing to gain ever more power for women.

Modern man therefore appears largely a product of the feminization of society, even in the police and armed forces he is no longer a monopolist. The Frankfurt School argues that the “authoritarian personality” is the result of the patriarchal family with this argument further being used as a tool for placing psychological pressure on the European man. Initially everything was done under the guise of women's liberation, and the Marxist Cultural Revolution took place almost unbeknownst to the academic community but when the professors finally noticed, "Critical Theory" and "Postmodernism" had already begun to spread widely in all faculties and departments.

Frankfurt School argues that the authoritarian personality is a product of the patriarchal family. This idea, in turn, follows directly from the "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" Engels, which glorified the idea of matriarchy. Moreover, it was Karl Marx in the "Communist Manifesto" who wrote about the concept of a "Community of Women." In 1845 in "The German Ideology" Marx also spoke disparagingly of the family as the basis of society.

The concept of "authoritarian personality" should not only be interpreted as a model for the conduct of a war against prejudice as such. This is a guide for the psychological warfare against the European man to bring him to a state of unwillingness to defend traditional beliefs and values. In other words, the goal is to soften or
"castrate" him. Undoubtedly, the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt had this in mind, as they used the term "psychological techniques to change personality.

The "authoritarian personality", studied in the 40's and 50's by Western European and American followers of the Frankfurt School, prepared the way for psychological warfare against the male gender role. The "goal" was promoted by Herbert Marcuse and others under the guise of the "Women's Liberation" movement and the "New Left" in the 1960s. Evidence that psychological techniques aimed at personality changes are focused in particular on the European men, were also provided by Abraham Maslow, the founder of the "Third Force Humanist Psychology" and promoter of psychotherapeutic techniques in public school classrooms. He wrote that "the next step is to enter personal evolution beyond masculinity and femininity into one of common humanity."

Proponents of cultural Marxism, of course, know what they want and how they plan to achieve this. In fact, they have already successfully completed much of their program.

How has this situation arisen in European universities?

According to the observations of the American historian Gertrude Gimmelfarb it was snuck in past traditionalist scholars who almost did not even notice until it was too late. It all happened so "quietly" that when they "looked up", Postmodernism was already all around them. "They were surrounded by a tidal wave of multicultural subjects such as ‘Radical Feminism’, ‘Deconstructive Relativism as History’ and other courses" which undermine the preservation of Western civilization. The tidal wave, in fact, slipped just as anticipated by Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School - a quiet revolution that spread the ideology of hatred of Europe, which has the goal of destroying Western civilization, and is in fact anti-God, anti-Christian, anti-family, anti-nationalism, anti-patriotism, anti-conservatism, anti-ethnocentric, anti-masculine, anti-tradition and anti-morality.

Thus, the cultural Marxism, which was preached by the Frankfurt School, has stimulated the extremely popular and destructive
concepts of "positive discrimination", "multiculturalism" and "diversity". No one can escape these terms today. These ideas have destroyed all the protective structure of European society and marked the beginning of the Islamization of Europe.

Thus, we have that the original economic doctrine which today is contributing to fundamental changes in society. There is not only the global market development taking place, influenced by the same ideology of cultural transformation, but the transformation of society and family.

Naturally any such process is associated with some irreparable loss. Will it be possible to avoid them? It depends on the activity, organization and success of conservative European forces, represented mostly by men, the rejection of radical globalism and finally the rejection of the feminization of society, and of themselves, in particular.
Anton Zheleznyak

Report given at the round table “Ethno-cultural identity in Europe and Eurasia”, Moscow, Russia, 31 October 2016.

Pan-Eurasian Patriotism and the Concept of "Blossoming Complexity" in Eurasianism

The development of a cultural policy in Russia after the chaos of the 1990s required the state to review the basic principles of the approach to the solution of the national question and of the development of the cultures and traditions of individual ethnic groups within the territory of Russia. After discarding the concepts of the "peoples' friendship" and of the "Soviet peoples" a gaping hole remained in the scientific and socio-political discourse, which is still has not been refilled. Although the Preamble of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation states the "multinational peoples" as the subject of the Russian state, the fact is, that a number of conceptual issues have not yet been resolved. Thus we see it as logical to appeal to the ideas of the classical Eurasians and their concepts of a "pan-Eurasian nationalism" and a "blossoming complexity".

Pan-Eurasian patriotism

The national ideal of the classical Eurasians is based on the idea of a harmonic "unity in variety" the major element of which is the dialectical category of "pan-Eurasian nationalism", which organically combines two opposites through having a common end. On the one hand, every peoples has to be aware of their own identity, has to maintain and develop their own culture. But on the other hand this "otherness" should not be in conflict neither within the Russian
nation, nor within the framework of the pan-Eurasian civilization, since there is a commitment to the single idea and the single interest of Russia-Eurasia (as a civilization), where the pan-Eurasian patriotism has a supra-ethnic character and brings together all the peoples of Russia-Eurasia into a single entity.

The development of "pan-Eurasian patriotism" allows to create a kind of common Eurasian identity, which is closest to the "Soviet peoples" concept, but on a different basis. According to Prince Nikolay Troubetskoy, the Marxist class ideology could only temporarily unite the peoples of the USSR, and the emphasis on a permanent class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat with the time had to decline, as it.²

Today, however, the search for a new "single substrate of statehood" should be continued and the key for solving the national question and for the removal of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic conflicts can be found by legitimizing of "pan-Eurasian nationalism," which we propose to replace with the more positive term of "pan-Eurasian patriotism."

And although the term has not yet been introduced into the legal lexicon, the questions that correspond to the essence of this term are already widely used. Paragraph 11 of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation covers pan-Eurasian patriotism and the sphere of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. The document declares that "Russia's traditional spiritual and moral values are in revival. The younger generation has adopted a respectful attitude towards Russian history. The civil society consolidates on common values that form the foundation of statehood, such as the freedom and independence of Russia, humanism, inter-ethnic peace and harmony, unity of culture of the multinational peoples of the Russian Federation, respect for family and religious traditions, patriotism".³


**Blossoming complexity**

Apart from pan-Eurasian patriotism an important part in the conduct of contemporary identity policies has to play the concept of "blossoming complexity", a term introduced by a precursor to Eurasianism - Konstantin Leontiev. In the context of globalization, we can observe an increasing trend of socio-cultural secondary simplification, secularization and erasure of ethno-cultural identities.

These trends can be observed all over the globe, not only Russia, but especially and above all in the West. Especially “South-to-North” migration flows change the identity image of modern Europe. Already today the EU is home to more than 15 million Muslims and it is projected that the number could increase to 30 million by 2025, which, together with the effects of the US-American cultural hegemony, could lead to the de-europeanization of Europe. Further, the proportion of the white population in the United States is rapidly declining. According to a forecast published by the US Census Bureau in 2008, the proportion of the white population of the country will be reduced to 50.8% by 2040, while in 2050 another ten years, at it will amount only 46.3%. Russia is not that affected by the adverse effects of migration flows and one should omit the rhetoric of nationalist groups and populist politicians in our country, which historically developed as a poly-ethnic state, where the "blossoming complexity" was able to develop organically.

In contrary to the Western concept of "multiculturalism", which involves the external form of toleration and acceptance of others, it is more logical to use the term "empathy" in Russia, i.e. the awareness of others like oneself, the transfer his mentality onto one’s own. It is this quality that allows the harmonious development of the ethno-cultural identities of the Russian peoples and helps the state to

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4 Leontiev K. Byzantium and the Slavs. East, Russia and the Slavs. Moscow, 1875 (K.N. Leont’yev. Vizantizm i Slavyanstvo. «Vostok, Rossiya i Slavyanstvo». Moskva, 1875 g.).


adequately support the conduct identity policies without prejudice or bias in favor of one ethnicity and the expense of another.

**Conclusion**

It can be noted that the development of "pan-Eurasian patriotism", both within Russia and the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), including common benchmarks and goals in cultural and youth programs, is fully consistent with our common interest of creating a conflict-free society that respects the sovereignty of the person, the peoples and the EAEU Member-States, as well as the creates the conditions for the full development of an inter-confessional and inter-ethnic "peoples’ friendship" and for a dialogue between our complex social communities. This is consistent with the New Right concept of ethnopluralism and of identity policies aimed at the development of a "blossoming complexity" in contrary to the transatlantic tendencies of secondary simplification and melting-pot multiculturalism.
Farkhad Gumarov

Report given at the round table “Ethno-cultural identity in Europe and Eurasia”, Moscow, Russia, 31 October 2016.

Comparative Analysis of Ethno-Cultural Identity in Contemporary Tatarstan and Turkey

Tatarstan

The Tatars are the second largest autochthonous peoples in the Russian Federation. It is necessary to maintain their regional component and not to give in to much to globalizing trends.

The 1990s was the first stage in post-Soviet Russia towards the manifestation of strategies for the actualization of identity policies, the rebirth of Russia’s titular nations and the construction of new regional identities. The federal government conducted a policy in response to the initiatives of regional elites, aimed at maintaining the country’s unity, that in fact was a policy of acknowledgment and support for ethno-cultural differences, which contributed to the recreation of Russia’s poly-ethnic diversity.

During this first stage, an actualization of ethno-cultural identity of the Tatars from Tatarstan took place, as well as a significant increase of their interest towards their own culture, their traditional and national professional arts, on which the new ethno-cultural strategy of the republic, and, partially, the polycultural policy of the federal center, was based.
The whole political climate of the region was soaked with slogans and processes of the rebirth of the Tatar nation, language, culture and religion, which, to a certain extent, determined the republic’s vector of political development.

The 1990s signified the creation, in the Tatarstan Republic, of a new regional (Tatar) identity, triggered by the proclamation of Tatarstan’s sovereignty.

During the second stage in the 2000s we saw the formation of an overall Russian (Rus. “общероссийский”) national identity within the Russian Federation by the accentuation the country’s socio-cultural unity. The significance of the ethnic “Russian” and the national “overall Russian” culture increased once more. At the same time, at the regional level the processes of intercultural interaction between Tatars, Russians and other ethnic groups continued.

All of this was meant to aid in the preservation of the renewed self-consciousness of the Tatars while at the same time strengthening the positive identity of the Russians. From this point on, by supporting a concept of solidarity, both intercultural within the region, as well as between the region and the federal center, local officials started to articulate the Tatarstan Republic as part of an overall Russian national identity.

In the beginning of the 21st century we now see the interconnection and intertwining of Tatar, Turkic (i.e. the self-recognition as part of a greater Turkic world) and Islamic culture (i.e. seeing oneself as part of the Islamic civilization with spiritual and cultural values, inherent to Islam, which is an important part of the modern world and with a far fetching social and territorial outreach).

“Turkism”, however, did not receive serious development and does not constitute a dominant part of the Tatars’ self-awareness, despite the fact that Turkic self-identification was by far stronger in the Romanov Empire, and even more so at earlier stages in history.

The citizens of Tatarstan (Rus. “татарстанцы”), understanding themselves as part of the overall Russian political system, taking up, within it, a certain social and political role (and often high-standing
economic positions), see and think of themselves predominantly within the overall Russian national context. They embrace the federal center’s increasing attention to events in the Muslim religious life, in particular Moscow’s support for attaining religious education. The idea of creating the “Bulgar Islamic Academy”, a federal research and education center, was approved by Vladimir Putin and Muslim leaders of the country.

**Turkey**

The particularity about Turkish identity is its existence at cross-roads (between East and West, Christianity and Islam). We can also distinguish three levels of Turkish identity: ethnic, national and religious.

From the very beginning of its proclamation in 1923 the Turkish Republic has suffered an identity crisis, which transpired through its interior and foreign policy: in the way it actualized its contacts in East and West, in the way it sought foreign aid and models of modernization. The role and vision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder and first president of modern Turkey, was central to this, and even he wasn’t able to finally set the county’s place in the world.

Ataturk is famous for legislatively prohibiting Turks the wearing of traditional Turkish tarbooshes. To his opinion, this headgear was a “symbol of ignorance, negligence, fanatism and phobia of progress and civilization”.

Duality and contradiction are main features of Turkish identity. Its essence is a mix of secularity and Sunni Islam, of Western life style and traditional moral values.

The ruling elite of Turkey linked the solution of the Turkish identity problem with matters of national security. There indeed is a slight potential for the blurring of Turkish identity. This possibility led to the argument, that admitting the existence of other ethnic or religious identities within the state was (and even is to this day) perceived as an interior threat that contradicts the proclaimed idea of a nation-state unity.
It was not until the late 1980s, when the new leader of the country T. Ozal, who was elected in 1989 as president, offered a more balanced and tolerant motto designed to fill with new meaning the words of Ataturk, who said: “How happy is he, who can say – “I am a Turk”, by slightly changing it to “How happy is he, who can say – “I am from Turkey”.

In this new interpretation of the 8th President of Turkey relied in the experience of the United States that has managed to solve its identity problem by becoming a “melting pot” of ethnicities, cultures and nations.

While keeping the course towards the development of a secular society, towards the rapprochement between Turkish national and Western interests, Ozal emphasized the uniqueness of Turkey’s culture and traditions, its advantageous contrast to (other) European countries. Compared to Ataturk, Ozal stated the need to study the past, to love the history of one’s country, since tradition and culture are the foundations without which any evolution of society would be impossible.

For Ozal there was no uncontested link between progress and the West, whilst Atatürk emphasized the priority of Western civilization.

In addition to the national dimension of identity in Turkish society there still is the acute problem of the relation between secularism and religiosity. "The Turk” – as noted by the outstanding Russian (Soviet) Turkologist V. Gordlevsky – “is characterized by the fact that he always self-identifies with religion rather than with ethnicity. To the question "Who is he?" the Turks always answers: "I am a Muslim." Muslim and Turk are equivalent concepts for him".

In 2004, R. Erdogan identified himself as "a Muslim, a Turk and a democrat at the head of a secular government", stressing thus the complex nature of contemporary Turkish identity.

A growing number of Turks has become disappointed with the promised “European future”. Among them grows the number of eurosceptics. The Turkish government seeks to strengthen its positions in other foreign policy vectors - in Central Asia and in the
Arab world. Based on its geostrategic position, Turkey is increasingly demonstrating its membership to the Eurasian region.

Using the terminology of the American geopolitician N.J. Spykman, Turkey should to be defined as a country of the Eurasian rimland.

The essay “The Golden Background of Eurasia. The New Cold War and the Third Rome” published in early 2015 in Leipzig by Dimitrios Kisoudis, a German political scientist of Greek origin, may represent a new stage in the study of the Fourth political theory.7

In a book of 114 pages the graduate of Freiburg and Seville universities separates myths from reality regarding the old-new confrontation between Russia and the West. He introduces the German reader to the Eurasian ideology and provides his own unique interpretation on how political theories evolved in both Russia and the West. A special interest (and my personal sympathy) is aroused by his view on the theory of liberalism and on such concepts as postmodernism, post-structuralism and eurasianism itself.

In the first chapter Kisoudis puts forward the thesis about the beginning of the new (i.e. the second) Cold War between Russia and the West. The Ukrainian conflict of 2014 is its starting point. Defining Russian-Western relations in this way the author tries to discover some differences and similarities with the first Cold War that took place from 1945 to 1991 between USSR and USA. In his comparison the researcher defines two aspects of confrontation – geopolitical (including resource-based conflicts) and ideological.

The geopolitical component has stayed the same – it is the opposition between Eurasian land power (Makkinder’s “Heartland”) and the

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transatlantic sea powers. Kisoudis admits that this time Russia begins with far less favorable starting conditions because it had lost the first Cold War in 1991 and thus her territory shrank as well as her ability exert influence upon the continent.

Next Kisoudis examines the contradictions in ideology. The worldview confrontation of the first Cold War was obvious, he says: the open Capitalist West versus the authoritarian Socialist East. Now, according to Kisoudis, ideological boundaries are not that clear. There indeed are evident differences in attitudes — but not along the former border between “capitalism” and “communism”.

Supporters of Washington and Moscow are represented among all three political groups: liberals, socialists and nationalists. That became apparent during Ukrainian conflict. For instance, whereas the old nationalists of Poland, the Baltic States and the Anglo-Saxon world are following the West, Italian, French, German and Greek New Rights advocate Russia. Left-wing socialist anti-imperialists also support Russia (e.g. the German Left Party, or the voluntary interbrigades fighting in Donbass), but the New Left (for example, the German so-called “anti-fascists”, Green parties or “Femen” activists) are opposing Russia since they see her, truly, as a bulwark of traditionalism.

But most interestingly is the fact that liberals also are divided into supporters and opponents of the modern West. Attention should be paid to the fact that Kisoudis, who writes his essay advocating Putin’s policy, considers himself a liberal. However, according to the author, it is not liberalism that dominates the Western political landscape, but its converted form – postliberalism (alas, Kisoudis doesn’t use exactly this term). He depicts modern American liberals not as liberals, but as imperialists and neocons, who, just as the Bolsheviks, wish to forcefully spread their system all over the world. The only difference is that the first believed in world revolution and the second – in the triumph of global governance and the global market. On the contrary, a true liberal prefers power of persuasion and is not inclined to spread his values and social patterns by the use of force.

Kisoudis divides modern liberals into “thick” and “thin” ones. The first, or neocons, are violently set against Russia, in every way possible
they support an increase in the military budget as well as intervention in the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern conflicts (such are, for example, John McCain or the Victoria Nuland and Robert Kagan couple). The second (such as Murray Rothbard, Noam Chomsky, Ron Paul) disengage themselves from other countries’ domestic problems and argue for the building of a truly liberal society in the USA.

As well as some other social scientists Kisoudis states that there is a similarity between the radical left and the neocons. In fact, American liberals are neo-trotskyists wishing the dominance of one ideology and political system – the same way as the Bolsheviks dreamed of World Revolution. The neocons are actually advocating the strengthening of state influence, even though they conceal it.

After this analysis the author tries to understand what the defining feature of new ideological confrontation between Eurasia and the Transatlantic community really is. For this purpose he appeals to Alexander Dugin, who regards liberalism as the principal reason of Western degradation and all the troubles in the world. However, Kisoudis disagrees with the Russian philosopher and rejects such opposition of “liberalism vs. traditions” as well as the thesis that moral degradation, imperialism and westernization are inevitable consequences of the liberal theory. For this purpose Kisoudis gives the example of Friedrich von Hayek, the father of the Austrian school of economics. He was a staunch opponent of Keynesianism and promoted the idea of “private money” but also emphasized the importance of traditions, because, to his opinion, “people can adequately make decisions only when using the accumulate experience of previous generations”. According to Kisoudis, the real reason for degradation in the West lies in the predominance of postmodernism. He comes to the conclusion that the actual fight takes place between those who support traditional values and those who advocate postmodernism.

What differs postmodernism from liberalism? In its time liberalism was a natural response to the rigid and unjust hierarchical system that prevailed in the Middle Ages. Thus liberal theory has its value, such as respect for human dignity, equality before the law, people’s access to governance. Though, with the transition to the postmodernist era
liberalism in the West has degenerated into its extreme – postliberalism.

For a better understanding of postmodernism it is necessary to study its origins – post-structuralism, the main exponent of which was the French philosopher Michel Foucault. All the three political theories had emerged in the modern age, which was defined by structuralism. This means that every ideology has its more or less clear and coherent structure (its elements, subject and object, friends and foes, etc.). But the main feature of postmodernism is “discourse”. The control of discourse, to be exact.

Through the possession, concentration and control of all mainstream media assets in the Western states the global financial elite and high circles behind the scenes (the so-called “deep state”) started to control the discourse in society. This postmodernist elite determines the content of the social discourse, in other words — they decide what should and should not be talked about. And anyone who disagrees with the prevalent status quo will be ostracized. For postmodernism and post-structuralism the discourse is of fundamental importance, while the context pales into insignificance. The structures of the three political theories collapse, their elements randomly switch places; the emphases are also placed differently. For example, the Old Left emphasized anti-imperialism and social justice; the New Left accentuates feminism and environmentalism. As a result, this leads to standardization and the destruction of traditional values. Postmodernism also involves the fight against tradition and the elimination of borders between ideologies, nations, cultures and even the sexes. Here Kisoudis appeals to the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev and his concept of “secondary blending oversimplification”, which is now observable in the West. So Eurasian Russia is opposing this exact trend and stands up for the preservation of diversity, traditional religions and cultural identities of the peoples all over the world.

For Kisoudis, the opposition between traditionalism and postmodernism makes up the major metaphysical foundation of the confrontation between Russia and the West. On the political level this corresponds to the confrontation between western “monetary socialism” and Russian “authoritarian liberalism”, he argues. This
conclusion may seem surprising, but Kisoudis provides some strong evidence.

The Transatlantic states are using methods of Orwellian control and love to interfere in people’s private lives. The USA is setting quotas for African Americans to enter universities. In Europe, government dictates how many women there should be in the boards of directors. In the West in general it is the state who is mainly financing the propaganda of “LGBT values” and persecutes by law anyone who disagrees. The amount of government involvement in the economy is another indicator for Kisoudis. For instance, income tax in some European states is extremely high taking away almost half of the wages (45% in Germany). The average amount of government spending as percentage to GDP in the European Union is also about 50% or even higher (60% in Denmark and Greece). All these facts are not consistent with the liberal theory that expects a minor role of the state.

Otherwise, Russian authoritarian liberalism allows freedom in economy and domestic affairs. Russia does have opposition media (such as the publications of “Kommersant.Money”, “Kommersant.Power”, TV-channel «Rain», news on Mail.ru, etc.). Russian income tax is no more than 13%, while the state’s share in GDP is less than 38%. It is also little known outside of Russia that many patriotic Russians consider Putin’s economic policy too liberal. Authoritarianism only displays itself as a strict resistance to the weakening of traditional values and external threats to sovereignty.

One may say that “monetary socialism” is not an appropriate term. Well, by mentioning “socialism” Kisoudis tries to show the new leading role of the state within society (the “deep state”, to be precise), the coercive nature of governance techniques. “Monetary socialism” does not imply the idea of social justice. Thus, it rather should be called “monetary fascism” since it is characterized by the influence of huge transnational corporations and their lobbys covering up their policies with liberal concepts yet in fact implementing a postliberal, antidemocratic and neocolonialist agenda.

Summing up, the following conclusions can be drawn. The geopolitical component of the first and the second Cold Wars did not
change, while the ideological confrontation assumed a different character: the new conflict is all about postmodernism versus traditions. In politics it manifests itself as the opposition between Eurasian authoritarian liberalism and Western monetary fascism. Kisoudis advocates the benefits of true liberalism. This point is very important for the supporters of Fourth Political Theory, which is supposed to integrate the best of all of the three previous political theories, not only that of socialism and nationalism (that is, of the Conservative Revolution).

The book “The Golden Background of Eurasia. The New Cold War and the Third Rome” can be recommended as highly required when studying the Forth Political Theory and Putin’s “authoritarian liberalism” – an original realization of the Eurasian philosophy that reveals Russia’s mission to defend traditional values, as well as cultural, economic and political diversity.
About the authors

**Vladimir Putin** (Moscow) is the current President of the Russian Federation, holding the office since 7 May 2012. He was Prime Minister from 1999 to 2000, President from 2000 to 2008, Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012, and President from 2012 to this day.

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The Eurasian Movement of the Russian Federation was established in 2015 at the Ethnomir ethno-cultural open air museum (Kaluga Region, Russia) on the basis of the youth-social movement "Young Eurasia". It is the largest socio-political Eurasian movement in Russia and in all of the post-Soviet space. On 25 August 2016, the Movement acquired the official status of a legal entity.

The mission of the Movement is the "construction of the Eurasian Union on the basis of the theory of Eurasianism".

The main objectives of the Movement are: supporting Eurasian integration in the field of public diplomacy, promoting interethnic and interreligious harmony, protecting the ethno-cultural identities of the indigenous peoples of Eurasia, preventing extremism, popularizing traditional religious values and healthy lifestyles, fostering pan-Eurasian patriotism, promoting economic modernization, strengthening the sovereignty Russia.

To achieve these goals, the main objectives of Movement are: publication of books and other printed publications, internet and social media, lectures, seminars, round tables and conferences (primarily at universities), conducting educational schools and sport-patriotic youth camps, conducting social surveys, conducting pro-Eurasian street events (e.g. flash mobs), drafting and discussion of law projects, aid in the career development of young people, as well as any other activities, not prohibited by the legislation of the Russian Federation and the Statute of the Movement.

The ideological basis of the Movement is neoclassical Eurasianism - a synthesis of the ideas of classical and pragmatic Eurasianism, as well as of Russian social and religious thought from the 19th century to the present day.

With the upbringing of a new generation of Eurasianists, the Movement gives particular importance to synthesis of patriotic ideology with professional knowledge and a realistic approach.

The Eurasian Movement of the Russian Federation fully respects the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the political regime of the countries of the post-Soviet space, as well as the voluntariness, the multileveled and stepwise approach of the Eurasian integration process.